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Barber: Congressional Oversight: Interpreting the Phrase "Financial State

NOTE
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: INTERPRETING
THE PHRASE "FINANCIAL STATEMENTS"

WITHIN SECTION 10A OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2001, Enron Corporation ("Enron"), a company whose
stock once traded at ninety dollars per share,' announced that it had
overstated its net income by $583 million.2 This announcement was the
impetus behind a sell off in Enron stock that, at the end of 2001,
culminated in the stock price reaching levels as low as eighty-seven
cents per share.3 Essentially, "Enron came unglued as a result of a loss of
investor confidence in the honesty of its accounting." 4 As a result of its
collapse, Enron filed for bankruptcy in what was at the time, "the biggest
such filing in U.S. history."' Additionally, many of Enron's employees
lost their entire savings as their 401(k) plans, which were largely funded
with Enron stock, were wiped out.6 The recent activities of Enron and
Arthur Andersen, Enron's outside auditor, have prompted the Securities
1. See John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Corporate Veil: Behind Enron's Fall, A
Culture of Operating Outside Public's View, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001, at Al.
2. See Judith Bums, SEC'S Herdman Urges Accounting Firms to Improve Auditing, Citing
Enron's Fall, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2001, at CI0.
3. See Jonathan Weil, Audits of Arthur Andersen Become FurtherFocus of Investigation by
SEC, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2001, at A3 (stating that Enron lost $75 billion of market value due to
accounting improprieties); see also Emshwiller & Smith, supra note I (stating the low price of
Enron's stock).
4. Rebecca Smith, Power Industry Cuts Plans for New Plants, Posing Risks for PostRecessionary Period, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2002, at A3; see generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid", 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1405, 1419
(2002) (describing the fall of Enron as a result of auditing and accounting failures).
5. Rebecca Smith, Enron Filesfor Chapter I/ Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy, WALL ST. J., Dec.
3, 2001, at A3.
6. See James K. Glassman, Diversify, Diversify, Diversify, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 2002, at
AIO (discussing how thousands of Enron employees lost their savings because Enron stock
comprised three-fifths of its 401(k) plan assets).
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and Exchange Commission ("Commission") to conduct an investigation
into Enron's accounting practices.7
In June of 2002, the telecommunications giant, WorldCom, Inc.
("WorldCom"), announced that it had overstated its net income by
nearly $4 billion in what has been dubbed "one of the largest accounting
frauds in history."' Soon after publicly revealing its accounting
overstatement, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy protection and surpassed
Enron to be crowned the largest company to file for bankruptcy in
history. 9
The Enron and WorldCom sagas are merely the tip of the iceberg in
the realm of accounting fraud." Once large, stalwart companies have
recently crumbled due to the dismantling of their accounting house of
cards. The problem has become so rampant that, in 1998, it became the
Commission's Division of Enforcement's number one priority." The
then director of the Division of Enforcement, Richard H. Walker, issued
a "call to arms" to the Commission to crack down on accounting fraud
and stressed the importance of outside auditors in the process of
detecting it.'2 Although the Commission was (and still is) well
intentioned on curbing accounting abuses, its limited resources greatly
inhibit its ability to achieve that goal. Consequently, the Commission
must go outside its doors for investigatory assistance often
"rel[ying] on
4
3
the press [and] company whistleblowers" . . .for leads."'
The old adage "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure"
has no more importance than in the realm of detecting financial
7. See Weil, supra note 3, at A3.
8. Jared Sandberg et al., WorldCom Adnits $3.8 Billion Error in its Accounting, WALL ST.
J., June 26, 2002, at Al.
9.

See Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, at

A3.
10. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 4, at 1406-07 (describing the nexus between earnings
restatements and accounting frauds and stating that the number of restatements has increased
precipitously from 1997 to 2000).
1I. See Richard H. Walker, Behind the Numbers of the SEC's Recent Financial Fraud Cases,
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch334.htm.
(Dec. 7, 1999); see also Coffee, Jr., supra note 4, at 1407 n. 19.
12. See Walker, supra note 11.
13. Whistleblowers were so instrumental in the uncovering of accounting fraud at both Enron
and WorldCom, Inc. that Time Magazine named two corporate insiders, Sherron Watkins of Enron
and Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom, its Persons of the Year for 2002. See James Kelly, The Year of
the Whistle-Blowers, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 8. Ms. Watkins and Ms. Cooper are symbols of
honesty and courage in a corporate climate of greed, deception, and intimidation that oftentimes
tums would be whistleblowers into willfully blind facilitators.
14. Michael Schroeder, SEC List of Accounting-Fraud Probes Grows, WALL ST. J., July 6,
2001, at Cl.
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reporting fraud. By curing a fraud before its effects are cemented into a
set of financial statements, regulators can save investors millions of
dollars in potential trading losses. The aforementioned sources, although
effective in an "after-the-fact" way, provide little preventative means for
curing fraudulent behavior. The press usually can only conduct
investigations based on public information and it oftentimes takes
whistleblowers years to uncover fraud or build up enough courage to say
something about it. Therefore, the Commission has sought ways to
uncover accounting improprieties before fraud-idden financial
statements are released to the public.' 5 One way to accomplish this goal
is to place pressure on a company's outside auditors, who must certify a
company's financial statements before public release, to report
accounting fraud to the Commission in advance of public filings.
Auditors are often considered "the first line of defense in the fight
against fraud."' 6 Currently, four main auditing firms exist in the United
States and each are paid by companies to audit their financial
statements. 7 The purpose of such audits is to certify, to a certain level of
reasonableness and materiality, that company-prepared financial
statements are accurate. Without an audit, investors could only rely on
the representations of a company's management, who may be too selfinterested to be credible. The purported independence and astute
financial acumen of auditors makes them the strongest weapon in the
Commission's fraud-fighting arsenal.
Yet, due to the nature of the relationship between auditors and their
clients, auditors are oftentimes under tremendous pressure "to produce
earnings growth", and this pressure can turn auditors into "enablers."' 9
Many see the conflicting nature of the auditor-client relationship as
causing auditors to forsake "their traditional role of outside skeptic for
that of inside business partner and [transforming] ... their age-old

function of discloser of information for that of master magician who

15. See id. (stating that Commission accountants have been looking for ways to discover
accounting fraud earlier).
16. Id.
17. See PCAOB Pledges to Review Big Four,at http://www.smartpros.com/x37084.xml (Feb.
13, 2003) (listing the four largest accounting firms); Coffee, Jr., supra note 4, at 1406-08.
18. See 0. RAY WHITTINGTON ET AL., PRINCIPALS OF AUDITING 46-47 (10th ed. 1992).
19. Bruce Nussbaum, Can You Trust Anybody Anymore? The Scope of the Enron Debacle
Undermines the Credibility of Modern Business Culture. Let's Get Back to Basics, BUS. WK., Jan.
28, 2002, at 31.
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hides the financial rabbit."2" Because of the incestuous relationship
between auditors and the companies they audit, a legal duty to report
fraud to the Commission before it is made public is necessary not only to
prevent investor losses but also to ensure that auditors will even report
fraud.
In 1995, Congress overrode a presidential veto and passed the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").2 The PSLRA was
enacted as a response to an alleged overabundance of securities lawsuits
brought by shareholders against public companies.22 The PSLRA's main
purpose was to deter securities litigation.23 Nevertheless, Congress,
within the PSLRA, amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
include section 1OA ("10A"). 24 1OA states, in pertinent part, that if "in
the course of conducting an audit" an "independent public accountant
detects or otherwise becomes aware of information indicating that an
illegal act25 . . . has or may have occurred," the accountant must

20. Id. The auditor-client relationship provided for conflicts in two main ways. First, the fact
that clients pay auditors for their services creates an opportunity for clients to threaten dismissal if
auditors do not acquiesce to aggressive accounting policies. Secondly, auditing firms would often
sell consulting services with their auditing services. Consulting contracts were extremely lucrative
and clients often used the contracts as leverage against auditors. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 4, at
1408-16. With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, however, auditors are no longer
allowed to perform certain non-audit services for their audit clients. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1
(2002)). The act therefore eliminated one of the conflicts inherent in the auditor-client relationship;
however, the fact that auditors are paid by the companies they audit is a conflict that still exists.
21. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1995)); see Andrew W. Reiss, Note, Powered by
More Than GAAS: Section IOA of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Takes the
Accounting Professionfora New Ride, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1262 n. 1(1997).
22. See id. at 1262 (stating that one of the purposes of the PSLRA was to assure "'that the
litigation process is not used for abusive purposes and does not unfairly target defendants who are
guilty of no wrongdoing').
23. See Jonathan M. Hoff et al., Developments in Pleading Under the PSLRA and the
Application of the PSLRA Safe Harbor 9, 16 (PLlI/Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. B0-015P, 2001), WL 1269 PLI/Corp 9) (stating that the PSLRA raised the pleading standards
for securities fraud actions).
24. See Reiss, supra note 21, at 1266 (stating that the "Reform Act's statutory audit
requirements were codified by adding section I0A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934").
25. Section 10A defines "illegal act" to mean "an act or omission that violates any law, or any
rule or regulation having the force of law." 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003). In this note, I will use the term
"fraud", "accounting fraud", and "illegal act" interchangeably. In fact, "a thorough search of the
legislative history leading up to the law's [10A's] enactment.., finds not even one mention of any
'illegal acts' covered by the law other than [financial] fraud." Thomas L. Riesenberg, Trying to
Hear the Whistle Blowing: The Widely Misunderstood "Illegal Acts" Reporting Requirements of
Exchange Act Section IOA, 56 Bus. LAW. 1417, 1429 (2001).
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determine whether an illegal act is "likely" to have occurred. 26 If it is
likely that an illegal act has occurred, the auditor must report her
findings to an appropriate level of management and the audit committee
of the board of directors.27 After informing the company's management
and audit committee, the auditor is required to determine if the "illegal
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003). This section is otherwise known as section 10A ("IOA") and
states, in part:
(b) Required Response to Audit Discoveries(1) Investigation and Report to Management.
If, in the course of conducting an audit.. .the independent public accountant
detects.. information indicating that an illegal act.. .has or may have occurred, the
accountant shall...
(A) (i) determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred; and
(ii) if so, determine and consider the possible effect of the illegal act on the
financial statements of the issuer.. .and
(B) as soon as practicable, inform the appropriate level of management of the
issuer and assure that the audit committee of the issuer... is adequately
informed with respect to illegal acts... unless the illegal act is clearly
inconsequential.
(2) Response to Failure to Take Remedial Action
If, after determining that the audit committee of the board of directors of the
issuer... is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts.. .the independent
public accountant concludes that(A) the illegal act has a material effect on the financial statements of the
issuer;
(B) the senior management has not taken, and the board of directors has not
caused senior management to take, timely and appropriate remedial actions
with respect to the illegal act; and
(C) the failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected to warrant
departure from a standard report of the auditor, when made... the
independent public accountant shall... directly report its conclusions to the
board of directors.
(3) Notice to Commission; Response to Failure to NotifyAn issuer whose board of directors receives a report under paragraph (2) shall
inform the Commission by notice not later than I business day after the receipt of
such report and shall furnish the independent public accountant making such report
with a copy of the notice furnished to the Commission. If the independent public
accountant fails to receive a copy of the notice before the expiration of the required
I business day period, the independent public accountant shall(A) resign from the engagement; or
(B) furnish to the Commission a copy of its report... not later than I business
day following such failure to receive notice.
(4) Report After Resignation
If a registered public accounting firm resigns from an engagement under paragraph
(3)(A), the firm shall, not later than I business day following the failure by the
issuer to notify the Commission under paragraph (3), furnish to the Commission a
copy of the report of the firm (or the documentation of any oral report given).
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003).
27. See id.
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act has a material effect on the financial statements of the issuer" and, if
so, whether or not management has taken the appropriate steps to
remedy the fraud.28 If the illegal act is material to the financial
statements and management has not taken adequate steps to remedy it,
the auditor is required to report the act directly to the board of directors.29
When the board of directors receives the auditor's report, it has only one
day to submit it directly to the Commission.30 If the board does not
report the fraud directly to the Commission, the auditor is required to do
so.

31

1OA places a legal duty on auditors to report fraud to a company's
board of directors or the Commission. The threat of legal liability for
failure to report a fraud would seem to be a motivating factor for
auditors to comply with their 1OA duties. However, to date, very few
10A reports have been filed with the Commission.32 In explaining why
so few reports had been filed, the Commission expressed concern that
auditors were failing to comply with their duties.33 Perhaps one of the
reasons why auditors may be failing to comply with 10A is the
ambiguous nature of its language. Specifically, the phrase "financial
statements" within the statute is not defined and, thus, may refer only to
the actual audited financial statements or to the audited and non-audited
financial statements that contain fraud discovered during an audit.
This Note examines the general mechanics of financial statement
fraud, its effect on investors, and the government's battle to stop it. It
will focus on the government's recent attack on financial fraud, via 10A,
and, in particular, how the phrase "financial statements" within the
statute could be used as a means of circumventing the act's
requirements. Part II of this Note discusses how past audit failures to
detect and report fraud and the need for the auditor as part of a "multiparty gatekeeper enforcement regime"34 led to the passage of 10A. Part
III describes some of the most notorious accounting ploys and discusses

28. Id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Riesenberg, supra note 25, at 1445-46.
33. See id. at 1445 n. 149.
34. Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in
Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1235-40 (2000) (defining the multi-party
gatekeeper regime as a group of corporate insiders, namely directors and members of the audit
committee, and outsiders, namely independent auditors, who are responsible for "detecting and
preventing corporate wrongdoing").
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the mechanics of the most common type of accounting fraud, improper
revenue recognition. Part IV explains the statutory ambiguity that exists
within 10A and Part V describes the reasons for interpreting the phrase
"financial statements" to mean both year-end and quarterly financial
statements. Part VI concludes by discussing how closing the 10A
loophole will affect fraud detection in the future.

II. WHY CONGRESS PASSED 10A
Auditors are the crucial component of the "multi-party gatekeeper
regime" that has become necessary in providing a check on improper
corporate governance.35 Part of an auditor's duty as gatekeeper is to
provide for "accurate financial disclosure of public corporations. 36 The
auditor's gatekeeper duties were legalized in the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., which explained that
auditors have a primary duty to the investing public to ensure accurate
financial reporting.37 The duty stated in Arthur Young was reiterated in
1987 by the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting ("Treadway Commission").38 In its report, the Treadway
Commission stated that financial fraud was prevalent in the corporate
world.39 One of its recommendations was to create corporate gatekeeper
duties for auditors.4" The gatekeeper function of the auditor is paramount
to the goal of protecting the investing public from fraudulent financial
reporting. 4' As stated earlier, without the independent auditor, investors
would have to rely mostly on insiders (i.e., management, the audit

35. Id. at 1215-16 (discussing the auditor's role as a watchdog for corporate malfeasance); see
Coffee, Jr., supra note 4, at 1405 (defining gatekeepers as "reputational intermediaries who provide
verification and certification services to investors"). Coffee goes on to state the main corporate
gatekeepers, which include independent auditors, debt-rating agencies, securities analysts, and, to a
lesser extent, corporate lawyers. See id.
36. Kostant, supra note 34, at 1215; see Coffee, Jr., supra note 4, at 1405 (describing the
gatekeeper's duties as "assess[ing] or vouch[ing] for the corporate client's own statements about
itself or a specific transaction").
37. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 806 (1984) (stating that "[i]n
certifying the public reports that depict a corporation's financial status, the accountant performs a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client").
38. See Kostant, supra note 34, at 1225 n.51.
39. See id.
40. Seeid. at 1238n.107.
41. See Bernhard Grossfeld & Werner Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A
Comparative View of Corporate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 397,
421 (1978) (stating that devices such as shareholder derivative lawsuits are rarely ever used to
enforce "directors' and officers' liability").
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committee, 2 and the board of directors) to provide for accurate financial
reporting. However, relying on insiders is often a bad idea because they
have incentives to intentionally misstate financial statements. 43 These
incentives arise from the fact that corporate managers' compensation,
and oftentimes their jobs, depend on meeting certain profit figures.4
Because of the importance of the auditor, Congress has passed laws
attempting to ensure that they meet their duty to the investing public.
A. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Its
Effect on Auditors
The most widely known antifraud provision of the securities laws is
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("10b").4 5 10b
makes it illegal to "employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe ....
Under this section, a fraudulent actor must have acted
with "scienter" in order to be found liable.47 Scienter is a term that
42. Although independent auditors have a very important gatekeeper role because of their
independence, independent audit committee members need to become increasingly involved in the
oversight of corporate financial managers. See Kostant, supra note 34, at 1235-43. The Blue Ribbon
Committee, a committee established to report on improving the effectiveness of corporate audit
committees, has suggested that audit committees be composed of only independent directors. See
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, Report
and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Committees, 54 BUs. LAW. 1067, 1072 (1999). This report recognized the importance of
having independent audit committees work side-by-side with outside auditors as participants in the
"multi-party gatekeeper regime" Kostant, supra note 34, at 1215. Perhaps as a result of the Blue
Ribbon Committee's report, Congress now requires that audit committee members be independent.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2002)).
43. See Schroeder, supra note 14.
44. See id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003). This statute is otherwise known as section 10(b) ("10b") and
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered....
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
46. Id.
47. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
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requires an actor to have acted with "intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud."48 Thus, negligent actors will not be liable under 10b.
Furthermore, reliance under 10b is presumed and, thus, does not have to
be proven by plaintiffs.49
Although 10b was enacted to deter financial fraud, its scienter
requirement made it difficult to apply to auditors. Plaintiffs found it
difficult to accuse auditors of having the requisite fraudulent intent,
since they usually have no role in the creation of a company's financial
statements, they merely check those numbers for accuracy."' In response
to plaintiffs' complaints, the courts imputed aider and abettor liability in
10b cases.' Although most aiders and abettors do not possess the
requisite level of fraudulent intent required by 10b, the courts justified
the inclusion of aider and abettor liability by citing to the remedial
purposes of the securities laws.52 The introduction of aider and abettor
liability in the securities laws had a chilling effect on the accounting
industry. Such liability made it possible for auditors to be held equally as
liable for accounting fraud as the managers who actually orchestrated
such frauds. The threat of 10b liability provided an incentive for auditors
to scrutinize financial statements with the level of independence required
by the investing public. This threat, however, dissipated with the
Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver.53
In Central Bank, the Court ruled that implying aiding and abetting
liability in 10b was not within the legislative intent of the statute. In
denying such liability, the Court stated that, even though the language of
10b includes actors who both directly and indirectly participate in fraud,
48. Id. at 193.
49. See Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 357 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). The reliance presumption in 10b is predicated by the Supreme Court's decision in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), which introduced the "fraud-on-the-market theory" for
determining reliance in 10b actions. See id. at 247.
50. For discussion about auditor's liability under 10b, see generally Robert A. Prentice,
Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and Secondary
Liability Under Section 10(B), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997).
51. See generally Brennan v. Midwestem United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D.
Ind. 1966); Pettit v. Am. Stock. Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
52. See Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680-81 (stating that the imposition of aider and abettor
liability was to "emphasize that a statute with a broad and remedial purpose such as the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 should not easily be rendered impotent to deal with new and unique
situations ... ").
53. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). The decision in Central Bank has been described as one of the most
important securities law decisions in a number of years due to the effect it would have on chilling
securities law suits. See Prentice, supra note 50, at 694-95.
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"aiding and abetting liability extends beyond persons who engage, even
indirectly, in a proscribed activity. 54 With the decision in CentralBank
now etched in stone, investors that want to sue auditors for financial
fraud must allege that they were active participants and possessed the
requisite mental state.5"
B.

Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

A much narrower remedy for aggrieved investors is section 18(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("18a").55 18a provides that a
person may be found liable for making or causing to be made
"materially misleading statements in any reports or other documents
filed with the Commission. . . ." The Supreme Court has stated that an

auditor who allows materially misstated financial statements to be filed
with the Commission may be liable for damages under 18a. 58 The
purpose of 18a is to encourage reliance on documents filed with the
Commission and, thus, the section is limited to only such documents.59
54. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 576.
55. At least one commentator has argued that such a line between primary and secondary
liability for auditors, for the most part, does not exist and, thus, there would be no need to provide
additional evidence of an auditor's participation in a financial fraud if it can be proven that the
corporation being audited (primary actor) committed a fraud. The argument centers around the fact
that auditors are so involved in the process of disseminating information about a company to the
public that they are essentially primary actors and should be held equally as liable. See generally
Prentice, supra note 50, at 696. The author does admit, however, that most lower courts have
delineated a difference between primary and secondary liability with respect to auditors. See id. at
723-25.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2003) otherwise known as section 18(a) ("I8a") states, in pertinent
part:
(a) Persons liable; persons entitled to recover; defense of good faith; suit at law or in
equity; costs, etc.
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application,
report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in
subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which statement was at the time and in
the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have
purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for
damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted
in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading ..
Id.
57. Id.
58. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,572 (1979).
59. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 556 (1979).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss3/7

10

Barber: Congressional Oversight: Interpreting the Phrase "Financial State

20031

"FINANCIAL STATEMENTS" AND SECTION IOA

859

The statute also allows for a "due diligence" defense if an auditor acted
in "good faith and had no knowledge that [a] statement was false or
misleading." 6 The Court has said that such a defense raises the requisite
mental state for the section to something "more than negligence., 6' The
Court's statement suggests that an auditor would have to be grossly
negligent in her audit in order to be liable. Such a standard knocks on the
door of a scienter requirement and, thus, makes it very difficult for any
auditor to be found liable for violating 18a. An additional difficulty is
the requirement that plaintiffs prove actual reliance on the misstated
financial statements. 61 Proving reliance requires evidence that investors
purchased securities based on reviewing a company's Commission
filings, many of which are voluminous and indecipherable to the
untrained eye. Such a scenario is extremely unlikely due to the size of
the investing public and the number of security trades conducted on a
daily basis.
Although auditors may be found liable under both 10b and 18a,
each section has its own, unique hurdles. Reliance under 10b is
presumed, however, proving an auditor was a primary actor acting with
scienter may be difficult. Alternatively, the mental state requirement
under 18a is a little lower than 10b, but one must prove actual reliance
on Commission filings. Thus, each section insulates auditors in its own
special way. The ineptitude of each section as it relates to auditors has
forced Congress to impose affirmative duties on auditors to report frauds
to a company's board of directors and, possibly, the Commission. These
new duties materialized in 10A.
C. Legislative History of lOA
The legislative history of 10A dates back to 1986 and the Financial
Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act. 6 ' This act was a response to the
savings and loan crisis and required auditors to establish audit
procedures to detect financial fraud as well as "report [fraudulent

60. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2003).
61. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.31 (1976).
62. See Ross, 607 F.2d at 556; Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Nat'l Student Mktg Corp.,
650 F.2d 342, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
63. See Riesenberg, supra note 25, at 1420; see also H.R. 4886, 99th Cong. (1986) (stating
that the Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act required auditors to "include reasonable
procedures for financial fraud detection" in their audits).
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6
activities] to appropriate regulatory and law enforcement authorities."
The sponsor of the Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act, then
Representative (now Senator) Ron Wyden, stated that the purpose of the
legislation was to "provide assurances to Congress and the public that
illegal and irregular activities ...[would] be discovered and reported to
the proper regulatory authorities ... .,,6 The auditing industry opposed
the new requirements to detect illegal acts because of the resulting
increase in audit costs. 66 Alternatively, the industry proposed that it
address the problems through non-legislative means.67 In addition to the
accounting industry, the bill met criticism from the Commission. 68 The
Commission felt the act would "'inhibit candid communication with the
client [and] create an adversarial relationship between the auditor and his
client." 69 Another issue was the broad language of the statute. As
originally proposed, the statute covered 'any illegal or irregular
64. See Riesenberg, supra note 25, at 1423 (citing the Hearings on Detecting and Disclosing
Financial Fraud Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 302 (1986)).
65. Reiss, supra note 21, at 1282 n.110 (citing the preamble of H.R. 4886, The Financial
Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act).
66. See Joseph I. Goldstein & Catherine Dixon, New Teeth for the Public's Watchdog: The
Expanded Role of the Independent Accountant in Detecting, Preventing, and Reporting Financial
Fraud, 44 Bus. LAW. 439, 495 (1989).
67. See id. at 442 (stating that the accounting profession had suggested, in response to
Congressional scrutiny, establishing "a wide variety of non-legislative reforms, including more
stringent professional standards for the detection and disclosure of fraudulent financial
reporting ....) The AICPA, American Institute of Public Accountants, has passed auditing
standards that require auditors to establish procedures to detect fraud. See Jeanne Calderon &
Rachel Kowal, Auditors Whistle an Unhappy Tune, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 419, 430-39 (1998)
(discussing the provisions for reporting illegal acts set forth in AICPA Statement of Auditing
Standards ("SAS") No. 53 & 82). These provisions require auditors to separately assess the risk of
fraud and design audit procedures to detect it; however, they do not require an auditor to report
fraud to parties outside the audit client unless a separate legal duty requires them to do so. See id.
The self-regulatory aspect of the auditing industry came under tremendous criticism during the
Enron scandal. See Nanette Byrnes et al., Accounting In Crisis, Bus. WK., Jan. 28, 2002 at 44, 4546. One of the criticisms was the fact that the Public Oversight Board ("POB"), which was "charged
with ensuring that the public interest is considered in the oversight of auditors" was entirely funded
by auditing firms. Id. at 45. The problems with the system were so serious that even members of the
accounting industry had admitted that it needed change. See id. at 46. This change occurred in 2002
with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 101, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002)). The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), which replaced the
POB as the main regulator of public auditing firms. See id. The PCAOB is funded entirely from
mandatory fees from public companies, rather than from the auditing industry. See id.
68. See Riesenberg, supra note 25, at 1422 (citing testimony from the SEC and Corporate
Audits (Part 6): Hearings on Detecting and Disclosing Financial Fraud Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 302 (1986)).
69. Id.
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activity' and critics worried that such a standard would require auditors
to report such things as 'parking ticket[s] or stolen pencil[s]."' 7
Responding to the criticism, Wyden amended his original proposal
to incorporate only those illegal acts that were deemed "material.'
Furthermore, the amended bill would allow a company's management to
be put on notice of any material, illegal acts being reported to
regulators.72 Although these changes should have quelled the statute's
critics, the statute was never passed.73
Wyden tried again in 1990, this time with the assistance of
Representative John Dingell.74 The 1990 bill was drafted to mirror the
auditing industry's own fraud detection standards and was passed by the
House of Representatives as part of a larger bill. 75 The Senate version of
the larger bill, however, did not include Wyden's amendments and his
amendments never made it into the ultimate bill drafted by the
Conference Committee.76
Wyden's persistence finally paid off in the end. In 1995, Congress
again addressed the issue of fraud detection by including a provision to
detect and report fraud in the PSLRA.77 The PSLRA was eventually
passed in 19957' and 10A became the statutory embodiment of Wyden's
desire to add an extra layer of investor protection against fraud in
financial statements.
III.

ACCOUNTING FRAUD

Enron and WorldCom are just a couple of big name companies that
have been involved in accounting scandals. 9 During 1999, fifty-five
percent of securities class action cases were based on accounting fraud.80
Furthermore, as of July 2001, the Commission was conducting nearly
260 investigations for accounting fraud." Historically, the number of
accounting fraud cases has increased twenty-eight percent over the past
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1423 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. E2986 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986)).
Id. (citing H.R. 5439, 99th Cong. § 2 (1986)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1424.
See id.
See id. at 1426-28.
See id.
See Schroeder, supra note 14.
See Walker, supra note 11.
See Schroeder, supra note 14.
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three years and the high number of investigations is not limited to small
companies but includes many of the nation's largest corporations."
When an accounting fraud is made public, investors lose millions of
dollars as stock prices tumble. s3 However, before the act is made public,
fraudulently inflated earnings may artificially increase the price of a
stock s4 Since many corporate executives' compensation packages are
tied to the price of their company's stock, there is a huge incentive to
manipulate reported earnings.85 Additionally, when the overall stock
market is thriving, companies may need to manipulate earnings in order
to meet heightened profit projections to maintain the price of their
stock.86 These incentives have allowed accounting fraud to transcend
government regulations and remain a thorn in the side of regulators and
the investing public alike.
There are five major types of accounting fraud that have been the
focus of Commission investigations.87 The types of fraud, some of which
are colorfully named, include: "'Big Bath Charges,'..... Merger Magic,"'
"'Cookie Jar Reserves, .... abuse of the definition
of materiality,"' and
88
"inappropriate revenue recognition practices."
In a Big Bath Charge, a company will overestimate one-time
restructuring charges in the hopes of adding the overestimated amount
into income in future years.89 When a company restructures itself, either
by closing certain plants and facilities or laying off employees,
accounting rules dictate that the costs related to the restructuring usually
be reported, in full, in the period in which they are incurred. 9
82. See id.
83. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Accounting for When Dreams Become Reality, WALL ST. J.,
June 13, 2001, at A21 (discussing the fate of companies such as Cendant and MicroStrategy and
how shareholders lost most of their investment due to accounting improprieties).
84.

See, e.g., The SEC Casts a Wide Net, Bus. WK., Oct. 11,

1999, at 50 (stating that a

scheme to inflate earnings resulted in a significant amount of stock trading profits).
85. See Schroeder, supra note 14 (stating that "[tihe pressure to assure maximum
compensation, which is tied to share price, is tempting more financial executives to play games to
manage earnings ....
").
86. See id. (stating that when companies miss analysts' quarterly earnings targets, stock prices
can tumble).
87. See Colleen Mahoney et al., Recent SEC Initiatives on Accounting and Financial
Reporting, 375, 382 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. BO-OOLK, 2000), WL
1213 PLlI/Corp 375.
88. Id.
89. See id; see also ARTHUR LEVITrr, TAKE ON THE STREET 160-61 (2002).
90. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 100, 64 Fed. Reg. 67, 154, 67, 155 (Dec. 1, 1999)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 ) (stating that "the term 'restructuring charge' is not defined in the
existing authoritative literature," but that "restructuring charges" usually include costs related to
"the consolidation and/or relocation of operations, or the disposition or abandonment of operations
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Oftentimes, companies restructure during times of economic difficulty; 9'
therefore, restructuring charges usually will not depress a stock price any
further than the current financial condition of the firm has already.92
Accordingly, an overestimation of restructuring charges in one year can
be added to earnings in subsequent years, thus inflating future earnings. 9'
In Merger Magic accounting fraud, a company will expense non
acquisition-related research and development costs as "in-process
research and development" charges. 94 In-process research and
development represents the value of purchased research and
development projects from acquired companies. 9 The value of the
acquired research and development projects may have been written off,
in full, on the consummation date of an acquisition.96 Since other merger
related costs are not expensed immediately but are capitalized and
expensed over a period of time, classifying non in-process research and
development costs as in-process research and development allows a
company to immediately expense costs that would otherwise have to be
expensed in the future.97 The benefit of expensing future costs in the year
or productive assets" and that the charges are usually incurred "in connection with a business
combination, a change in an enterprise's strategic plan, or a managerial response to declines in
demand, increasing costs, or other environmental factors"). The bulletin further states that
"restructuring charges" are expensed either when management commits to a restructuring plan or
when the costs are actually incurred. See id.
91. See id. (stating that a company usually restructures itself when management responds to
"declines in demand"); see, e.g., Charles Gasparino, Rebuilding Wall Street: Bear Stearns Will
Announce Big Staff Cuts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at C1 (stating that investment bank Bear
Steams had to restructure itself by laying off workers due to poor economic conditions).
92. See Colleen P. Mahoney et al., Accounting, Fraud, Earnings Management and the Role of
the Auditor, 27, 34 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. BO-0002, 2000), WL
1203 PLI/Corp 27 (stating that companies may attempt to classify future expenses as one-time
restructuring charges in the hopes that investors will ignore the charges).
93. See id.
94. See Mahoney, supra note 87, at 382.
95. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Amendments to the Listed
Company Manual Regarding Original and Continued Listing Criteria and Procedures, 64 Fed.
Reg. 23, 710-01, 23, 719 (May 3, 1999); see also DONALD E. KIESO & JERRY J. WEYGANDT,
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 586 (8th ed. 1995).
96. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. I by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Amendments to the Listed
Company Manual Regarding Original and Continued Listing Criteria and Procedures, 64 Fed.
Reg. 23, 710-01, 23, 719 (May 3, 1999); see also KIESO & WEYGANDT, supra note 95, at 586.
97. KIESO & WEYGANDT, supra note 95, at 572-73. The largest expense that is created in a
business combination, generally, is goodwill. Goodwill represents the excess of the purchase price
over the value of the book value (assets minus liabilities) of the target company. See RICHARD E.
BAKER ET AL., ADVANCED FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 12 (4th ed. 1999). Prior to 2001, under APB
Opinion No. 17, the cost of goodwill purchased in connection with a business combination had to be

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:849

of an acquisition is that a stock price is likely to be lower anyway in that
year due to other acquisition related charges. Expensing more costs in
the year of acquisition would, thus, have only marginal effects on a stock
price.
Companies create Cookie Jar Reserves9" with accounting provisions
that allow them to estimate certain expenses that have technically been
incurred in one period but the actual amount of which is not yet known. 99
Accounts such as "bad debts" and "warranty costs" are estimated
because the actual amounts of these accounts may not be known until
subsequent periods.' °° The opportunity exists for companies to
manipulate future earnings by intentionally over estimating the amounts
for these accounts in one year and dipping into the "cookie jar" in
subsequent years to add back overestimated amounts into future
earnings. 10
The next type of accounting fraud results from a firm abusing
materiality requirements.' 2 Accounting rules state that financial
statement errors below a certain amount need not be changed for they
are considered "immaterial."'' 3 Companies have been able to manipulate
materiality standards by intentionally recording errors that fall under
amounts considered "material."' '
All of the aforementioned frauds are avenues for earnings
management, or, as former Chairman of the Commission Arthur Levitt
put it, "'the practice of using accounting tricks to mask true operating
performance."'' ' 5 One of the most popular ways to manage earnings is
by improperly recognizing revenue.' 6 "In fact, more than half of
expensed (amortized) over a period not to exceed forty years. See id. at 14-15. However, in 2001,
the Financial Accounting Standards Board changed the rules for amortizing goodwill. See Ernst &
Young LLP, FASB Votes Unanimously to Approve New Business Combination Rules, 5 No. 3 M&A
LAWYER (2001). Currently, goodwill does not have to be expensed systematically over a certain
number of years but rather is subject to an "impairment" test every year. See id.
98. Mahoney, supra note 87, at 382; see also LEVITr, supra note 89, at 163-64.
99. See KIESO & WEYGANDT, supra note 95, at 84 (stating that certain account items are
considered "estimated items because the amounts are not exactly determinable at the time they must
by recorded.").
100. Id. at 84, 642.
101. See Mahoney, supra note 87, at 34.
102. See id.
103. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45, 150, 45, 151 (Aug. 19, 1999)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) (discussing the Commission's staffs interpretations of accounting
rules related to materiality).
104. See Mahoney, supra note 87, at 34.
105. Id. at 33.
106. See Jenkins, Jr., supra note 83.
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accounting lawsuits revolve around what's tactfully known as
'premature revenue recognition."" 0'
According to accounting rules, revenue cannot be recorded until it
is "realized or realizable and earned."' 8 By recognizing revenue before
or after it is actually earned, companies are able to manipulate financial
data to either make up for earnings shortfalls or defer gains until
subsequent periods. °9 In order for revenue to be "earned," there must
exist persuasive evidence of a contractual arrangement, delivery of
goods must have occurred or services must have been rendered, the
seller must have a fixed and determinable price, and collectibility must
be reasonably assured.' 0 If one of the above four criteria is not met,
revenue cannot be reported on a company's financial statements.III
However, companies may manipulate the revenue recognition rules in
order to meet Wall Street earnings estimates. This type of manipulation
necessitates stronger laws requiring auditors to report financial
accounting fraud. 10A is such a law; however, it may be rendered moot
in some cases if certain loopholes are not closed.
IV.

STATUTORY AMBIGUITY WITHIN

10A

The ambiguity within 10A deals with its effect on frauds that are
only material to quarterly financial statements but are not identified until
the year-end audit. Auditors establish materiality thresholds when
performing audits in order to prevent them from scrutinizing
insignificant financial data."2 An auditor's materiality judgment will
consider both quantitative and qualitative factors. ' 3 After these

107. Id.
108. Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 101, 1999 WL 1100908, at *2 (Dec. 3, 1999)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) (discussing how the Commission's staff will interpret accounting
rules related to revenue recognition). Note that Staff Accounting Bulletins "are not rules or
interpretations of the Commission... [t]hey represent interpretations and practices followed by the
Division of Corporate Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant in administering the
disclosure requirements of the Federal securities laws." Id. Furthermore, SAB No. 101 represents
"the staff's views in applying generally accepted accounting principles to revenue recognition in
financial statements." Id. Therefore, although SAB No. 101 is not technically a rule, it states how
the Division of Corporate Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant will interpret accounting
rules. See id.
109. See Mahoney, supra note 87, at 383.
110. See Staff Accounting Bulletin, No. 101, 1999 WL 1100908, at *2 (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 211).
Ill. See id.
112. See LARRY F. KONRATH,AUDITING CONCEPTS & APPLICATIONS 121 (2d ed. 1993).
113. See id. at 121-25.
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considerations, an auditor will set a materiality threshold that is usually a
percentage of net income and net assets.'"4 For example, after
considering the risks of misstatement in the audit, an auditor may
establish a materiality threshold of two percent of net income. This
threshold will become the benchmark for what is considered material
during the audit. Also impacting the materiality determination will be
qualitative factors such as "illegal payments, irregularities, and
contingencies."' 5 However, qualitative factors, such as fraud, may not,
in and of themselves, be material to the financial statements. When
considering whether qualitative factors are material, an auditor must
evaluate their overall effect on the financial statements." 6 Thus, whether
a fraud is considered material will depend on the quantitative effects it
has on a company's financial statements.
As stated in 10A, if a likely illegal act is not material to the
financial statements, the auditor is only required to report it to
management and does not have to report it directly to the board of
directors or the Commission."7 Thus, the auditor's 10A duties are
contingent upon quantitative aspects of the illegal act, which is a
function of the amount of net income reported in the financial
statements. The statute, however, is unclear as to which set of financial
statements the materiality standard applies.
A.

The Commission Required Reporting Periods

Securities laws require publicly traded companies to file both
annual and quarterly financial statements with the Commission. The
Commission requires auditors to scrutinize each set of financial
statements (quarterly and year-end) to insure their accuracy. The level of
scrutiny required varies depending on the type of financial statement.
An annual set of financial statements must be filed with the
Commission within a certain number of days after the end of a fiscal
year."8 Annual statements must be "audited" by an auditor." 9 An audit is
an extensive procedure that consists of substantive test work to verify

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.
Id. at 122.
See id. at 122.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I (2003).
See 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01 (2003).
See id.
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account balances within a set of financial statements.'20 The objective of
an audit is to determine the existence, completeness, rights, valuation,
and presentation of financial statement accounts.' 2' This objective is
realized by scrutinizing physical, documentary, mathematical, analytical,
and hearsay evidence.'22 The most extensive scrutiny financial
statements receive is during an audit and auditing procedures are far
more pervasive than other accounting procedures.
Requiring auditors to implement fraud detection measures during
an audit comports with the level of scrutiny required by one and the
comprehensive nature of audits allow for their implementation with little
additional cost. The combination of fraud detection procedures and
substantive test work provide the most thorough avenue by which
auditors may detect accounting fraud.
In addition to annual statements, the Commission requires reporting
companies to file interim financial statements every fiscal quarter.'2324
Commission rules require auditor's to "review" quarterly statements.'
A review is a less detailed examination than an audit and includes little
substantive test work.'25 Consequently, reviewed financial statements do
not receive the same level of scrutiny as audited ones. Therefore,
requiring auditors to implement fraud detection procedures in the review
process would be onerous, due to its limited scope.
Perhaps because of the extensive amount of resources devoted to an
audit, 10A applies only to frauds detected during the course of one.1
However, 10A does not indicate whether the fraud has to only be
material to the audited financial statements (year-end financial
statements) or whether the standard also applies to frauds uncovered
during an audit, but only material to a quarterly financial statement.
26

120. See WHITTINGTON & PANY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 4 (10th ed. 1992) (defining
an audit as a process by which auditors "undertake to gather evidence and provide the highest level
of assurance that the financial statements follow generally accepted accounting principals ... [a]n
audit involves searching and verifying the accounting records and examining other evidence
supporting those financial statements").
121. See id. at 111-14.
122. See id. at 114.
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2003).
124. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.10-01(d) (2003).
125. See KONRATH, supra note 112, at 664 (defining a "review" as a process that "consists
mainly of performing inquir[ies] and analytical procedures" and the scope and detail of which is
"less than an audit").
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003).
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B. Examples of the Problem
Assume that Company X ("X") is a publicly traded company that
produces widgets. At the beginning of the fiscal year, a well-respected
securities analyst that tracks X issues her quarter-by-quarter earnings
estimates. If the company fails to meet the analyst's quarterly earnings
projections, the price of X's stock will likely decline. X has also
established its own sales projections and learns that it will probably not
meet the analyst's first quarter numbers, meet the second quarter,
surpass the third quarter, and meet the fourth quarter. Thus, the
comparison of the analyst's projections and the company's projections
looks like this:
Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

$1,000,000

$2,000,000

$3,000,000

$4,000,000

$800,000

$2,000,000

$4,000,000

$4,000,000

ANALYST'S
SALES
PROJECTION
INTERNAL
SALES
PROJECTION

In this scenario, X faces a dilemma in the first quarter. It will not be
able to meet analyst's expectations for the first quarter and, thus, the
stock price is in jeopardy. In order to meet the analyst's estimates for the
first quarter, X decides to take orders not scheduled to be shipped until
the third quarter and record them as sales in the first quarter. Because
one of the criteria for recognizing revenue is that the goods must be
shipped before recordation,
X will have improperly recognized revenue
27
in the first quarter.'
At the end of the fiscal year, X's independent auditors conduct their
annual audit. During the course of that audit, the auditors discover that X
improperly recorded revenue in the first quarter that wasn't actually
earned until the third quarter. The auditors, therefore, have discovered a
fraud material to the first quarter financial statements during the annual
audit.
Because the revenue was actually earned in the third quarter, X's
year-end financial statements will probably contain no material
misstatements. Assuming that the phrase "financial statements" in 10A
127. See Staff Accounting Bulletin, No. 101, 1999 WL 1100908, at *2 (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 211).
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means only year-end financial statements, the auditor would not be
required to report the fraud to the board of directors.'28 Consequently, the
Commission would never learn about it via 10A. 29 If the phrase
"financial statements" is interpreted to mean both quarterly and year-end
statements, the fraud will most likely have to be reported to the board of
directors, since it is likely that the first quarter numbers are materially
misstated.
1. Commission Investigations
The aforementioned hypothetical resembles a recent Commission
investigation. Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") was being
investigated for possibly understating earnings in certain quarters in
order to create reserves that could be used to boost future earnings.'30
Specifically, the Commission was "concerned that Microsoft may have
set up an accounting system that held back revenue in the form of certain
cash reserves during some quarters, and then applied the reserves to
future quarters to smooth out earnings."'' The investigation of Microsoft
was initiated as a result of a wrongful termination suit filed by its former
internal auditor.'32 Had it not been for this whistleblower, the situation at
Microsoft might never have been brought to the attention of the
Commission.
In another recent Commission investigation, Nvidia Corporation
("Nvidia"), a computer chip manufacturer was being examined for
possible accounting violations.'33 The probe focused on whether "the
company improperly shifted $3.6 million in costs from the first quarter
of its 2001 fiscal year ... to the second and third quarters ... "".and is
looking into the way the company recorded certain reserve accounts to
achieve this expense shifting. '15 Much like Company X in the above
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003).
129. See id. (stating that the Commission does not have to be notified, under 10A, for
immaterial misstatements caused by illegal acts).
130. See Rebecca Buckman, SEC Continues to Investigate Microsoft, Asking Whether Profit
was Understated,WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at A3.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See Alex Berenson, S.E.C. Studies Accounting of Specialty Chip Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2002, at C2.
134. Id.
135. See id. Note that one possible way to shift expenses from one quarter to another is by
using "Cookie Jar Reserves." See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. A company could
simply underestimate certain costs that were incurred in the first quarter but the actual amount of
which is not known until the second quarter. See id.
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example, Nvidia needed to increase its earnings in the first quarter of
2001 and, thus, may have shifted some expenses that were incurred in
that quarter to other, stronger quarters.
Although the above alleged frauds were material to the companies'
quarterly financial statements, they most likely were not material to the
year-end statements. Thus, if 1OA's materiality standard were interpreted
to include only year-end financial statements, an auditor would never be
required to report the above fraud to the Commission.
36

2. SEC v. Solucorp Industries Ltd.1
Solucorp was a summary judgment action involving an auditor
accused of failing to comply with IA during an audit.'37 In 1997,
Solucorp Industries Ltd. (the "Company") intended to file a registration
statement with the Commission which included the "unaudited financial
statements for the quarter ended September 30, 1997. '' 3' Included in the
quarterly financial statements was revenue of $500,000 purportedly
earned from a licensing agreement that "had a commencement date of
June 1, 1997 and was 'dated as of' September 15, 1997."'"9 However,
evidence existed that the actual licensing agreement wasn't finalized
until later in the fiscal year and the Company was accused of backdating
the contract in order to include it in the September 30th quarterly
financial statements.' 40 The $500,000 posted in the September quarter
represented forty percent of that quarter's revenues, certainly a material
number by any means. 4 ' However, the revenue was eventually earned in
the 1997 fiscal year. Therefore, the year-end 1997 financial statements
would contain no material misstatement. Although the court denied the
auditor's motion for summary judgment, it did not rule on the definition
of "financial statements" in 10A' and that issue remains an avenue by
which auditors may wiggle out of their lOA duties.
If the materiality standards of 1OA are interpreted to include
quarterly financial statements, auditors would be required to report
accounting frauds relating to those financial statements directly to the
Commission, thereby eliminating the need to rely on the press or

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

197 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
See generally id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 2.
See generally id.
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company insiders. However, interpreting 10A to include only year-end
numbers will allow most frauds to go undetected by the Commission.
V.

FILLING IN THE GAP: 10A'S "FINANCIAL STATEMENTS" SHOULD
INCORPORATE BOTH QUARTERLY AND YEAR-END
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

The confusion surrounding which financial statements should be
included in 10A centers around the fact that the section only applies to
frauds discovered during an audit. Since quarterly financial statements
are not audited but merely reviewed, it would seem as if their inclusion
was not intended by Congress. However, a closer look at the situation is
required in order to determine exactly what Congress was thinking when
drafting 1OA.
A.

The Audit Function

The main argument for including only year-end statements under43
10A is that they are the only financials that are required to be audited.'
This analysis assumes that audits of year-end financial statements do not
consider information contained within quarterly financials. Yet, when
conducting an audit, auditors will consider information gathered
throughout the year.'" Thus, an annual audit can be seen as an audit of
that year's previously reviewed quarterly financial statements. This
analysis suggests that quarterly statements go through two testing
phases. The first phase is the review that occurs at the end of each
quarter and the second is the annual audit. The theory that an annual
audit is simply an audit of previously reviewed financial statements
comports with the Commission's ruling that states that annual audits
should consider information gathered throughout the year.14' Therefore,
the "audited" financial statements, in essence, are merely a compilation
of the audit year's quarterly financials.
B. The Importance of QuarterlyFinancialStatements
A materially misstated quarterly statement can cause serious
damage to investors since stock prices have become so sensitive to
short-term profit fluctuations. Quarterly data has become increasingly
143. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01 to 02 (2003).
144. See id.
145. See id.
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important as managers continue to sacrifice long-term growth for shortterm profit maximization. 146 Managers' unyielding desire to maximize
short-term profits has "translate[d] into an obsession with quarter-toquarter earnings."' 47 Management's desire to maximize short-term profits
is a result of a number of phenomenon that occurred during the last
decade. One such phenomenon was the introduction of stock options as
a form of compensation. Stock options motivated managers to focus on
short-term profit goals in order to maximize share value in a short period
of time. 48 If a stock price appreciated accordingly with quarterly profit
estimates, executives could exercise their options and cash out, leaving
49
other shareholders with a company with no long-term prospects.
Another incentive for focusing on short-term value is the fact that many
corporate acquisitions are financed with stock. Maximizing share value
in the short-term would give managers more leverage in an acquisition if
the company's shares were to be used as currency.,s0
Corporate management, however, is not totally to blame for the
current environment. Over the last few years, "companies have struggled
more and more desperately to meet analysts' expectations."' 5 ' Analysts'
requirement that the companies they follow meet quarterly earnings
projections originated when they began "challeng[ing] the companies
they covered to reach for unprecedented earnings growth"; missing their
estimates "by even a penny per share [could
lead to] an immediate
52
[stock price] plunge of 25 percent or more."'
The fact that quarterly financial statements receive such a low level
of scrutiny in the review phase creates an interesting paradox. As stated
above, missing an analyst's quarterly profit estimate can result in a stock
price facing the proverbial stock market guillotine.'53 Managers,
therefore, have a huge incentive to manipulate quarterly numbers and,
thus, most financial frauds probably occur within quarterly statements.
However, quarterly statements receive the lowest level of scrutiny by an
auditor. In order to remedy this problem, quarterly statements either
should be audited separately in order to detect fraud or should be
146. See David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and
What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 890 (2002).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 906-07.
149. See id.
150. Seeid. at910-12.
151. id. at 893.
152. Id. at 892-93.
153. See id. at 892-93.
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considered when performing fraud detection procedures during the
annual audit. Only until companies, analysts, and investors start focusing
on a company's long-term financial prospects, rather than short-term
numbers will the incentive to manipulate quarterly figures be eliminated
and so too will the heightened need to scrutinize those numbers for
fraudulent activity.
The current environment of short-term profit maximization has
generated a cult following for quarterly earnings. The pressure to meet
analysts' earnings estimates plus management self interest has made
manipulation of quarterly numbers a sport amongst executives. The
losers of this sport, however, are individual shareholders who invest for
the long term. These individual investors are who the securities laws are
intended to protect and, therefore, those laws must not be rendered
toothless by legal hairsplitting.
A.

IncreasedAudit Costs Would Be Minimal

Although the inclusion of quarterly financial statement would
technically increase the cost of an audit, the increase would be
insubstantial at best. The reason why any additional cost imposed by
10A is likely to be minimal is that the statute applies only to frauds
detected during audits. 54 Since auditors already are required to
implement fraud detection procedures in their audits,'55 making the
materiality standard apply to quarterly statements would not require the
implementation of any additional procedures. All 10A would require is
that if a material "illegal act" is detected, it be reported to management,
the board of directors, and possibly the Commission. 6 Therefore, the
only additional cost would be the cost of preparing more reports to these
bodies.
B.

The "PlainMeaning" Rule

When interpreting a statute, "[i]t is elementary that the meaning of
a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which
the act is framed."' 57 Using the language of the statute as the sole means

154. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003).
155. See supra note 67.
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003).
157. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 9 (Aspen Law and Business 1997) (quoting a statement from the

court's decision in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
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of interpretation is known as the "plain meaning" doctrine."8 Since no
definition of the phrase "financial statements" exists in 10A, 59
'" the next
logical source for a definition would be other sections within the
securities laws and Commission rules.
The Commission rule governing the filing of quarterly financial
statements is titled "Interim Financial Statements." 6 Since the
Commission has used the phrase "interim financial statements" when
describing quarterly figures, a blanket use of the phrase "financial6
statements" would seem to encompass quarterly financial statements.' '
In other words, instead of putting a qualifier such as "year-end" or
"interim" in front of the phrase "financial statements", Congress simply
used the generic phrase "financial statements" to express its intent that
the statute cover both quarterly and year-end financials.
Accounting textbooks have also broadly defined the phrase
"financial statements" to mean "statements that reflect the collection,
tabulation, and final summarization of accounting data."'62 This
definition is not specific as to the time period covered in a financial
statement.163 Thus, the definition includes both year-end and quarterly
data.
Finance textbooks also recognize quarterly reports as a type of
financial statement.'" One textbook defines an income statement as "a
financial statement showing a firm's revenues and expenses during a
specified period.' ' 65 This definition suggests that a quarterly income
statement would be considered a type of financial statement since it
shows a company's revenue and expenses for a specified period, namely
three months (one fiscal quarter). 66
Black's Law Dictionary also defines a financial statement as "[a]
balance sheet, income statement, or annual report that summarizes an
individual's or organization's financial condition on a specified period
by reporting assets and liabilities."'' 67 Since quarterly financial statements
158. See id. at 10.
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003) (citing no definition for the phrase "financial statements"
anywhere within the statute).
160. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.10-01 (2003) (citing the phrase "interim financial statements" to
describe quarterly financial statements).
161. Id.
162. KIESO & WEYGANDT, supra note 95, at 70.
163. See id.
164. See BODIE & KANE ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS 352 (2d ed. 1995).
165. Id.at 353.
166. See id.
167. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 631 (6th ed. 1990).
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are reports summarizing the financial condition of an organization for a
"specified period," those statements would be included within the legal
definition of "financial statements."
Although the "plain meaning" rule has' been advocated by the
courts, it is not used in every situation.' 68 Sometimes, courts will not use
the "plain meaning" rule if the result is in contravention with the
legislative intent of the statute. 69 However, the legislative intent of 10A
was to prevent fraud from materializing on any financial statement and,
therefore, it does not conflict with an all-encompassing definition of the
phrase "financial statements.' ' 70 The 7 "plain meaning" rule, therefore,
1
should be used to interpret the statute.
C. The Legislative History of lOA
When Congress enacted 10A, its intent was to provide an extra
layer of protection for the investing public against fraud.172 This
additional protection was prompted by the continued practice of73
to stop it.1
accounting fraud despite congressional and industry efforts
By interpreting the phrase "financial statements" to include only yearend statements, a loophole is created that allows frauds that are material
only to quarterly statements to go unreported to the Commission.174 Such
a loophole can have devastating consequences to investors since stock
prices can fluctuate greatly based on quarterly results. 75 Because its
intent was to detect fraud, Congress did not wish to create such a
loophole. 176
Congress's failure to define the phrase "financial statements"
within 10A was most likely an oversight rather than an intentional act.
Considering the legislative intent of the statute, it would be ridiculous to
conclude that Congress intentionally created a loophole that would allow
most frauds to go undetected by the board of directors or the
Commission.

168. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 157, at 10.
169. See id.
170. See supra part II.C.
171.

See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 157, at 10.

172. See supra Part II.C.
173. See id.
174. See supra Part IV.
175. See Jenkins, Jr., supra note 83.
176.

See supra Part I.c.
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CONCLUSION

The auditing industry is facing tremendous scrutiny by both the
public and the government. The fall of Enron and WorldCom is simply a
microcosm of the widespread infiltration of accounting fraud in
corporate America and the auditing industry's failure to detect it. This
problem has become so rampant that investor confidence is being
threatened and the fundamentals of our capitalist society are at risk.
Those that were supposed to inoculate the individual investor from the
ivory tower manipulations and deceit of corporate executives are
becoming infected themselves. In order to rebuild investor confidence in
the quality of financial reporting and in the auditing industry itself, the
legislature must enact laws that ensure auditors are fulfilling their duty
to the public and are not simply acting as corporate hand puppets. 10A is
a step in the right direction; however, its effect will be nullified if
unintended loopholes are not closed. Only until the phrase "financial
statements" is adequately defined by the courts to close the loophole
inherent in 10A will auditors have no choice but to abide by it and
reassume their role as corporate America's "'public watchdog."" 7 7
Jamie A. Barber*

177. See Kostant, supra note 34, at 1243.
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